Deviations from the Law of One Price across US cities are smaller than corresponding international deviations, but nevertheless substantial. We find that a proportion of these deviations can be explained by asymmetric responses to federal monetary policy shocks, and that a large part of the asymmetry can be explained by city-specific economic characteristics.
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Introduction
Although deviations from the Law of one Price across regions or cities within countries such as the US or Canada are smaller than international deviations, they are still not negligible (Parsley and Wei, 1996; Ceglowski, 2003) , and not confined to nontraded goods (Engel and Rogers, 2001 ).
Moreover, convergence towards intra-national purchasing power parity happens very slowly; the half-life of deviations from the Law of One Price in the US is estimated to be about nine years (Cecchetti et al., 2002) , regardless of the size of the initial deviation. Several of these authors find that transportation costs, proxied by distance, have a large role to play in explaining the average size of the deviations between two specific locations.
One question that has received relatively little attention is the source of the shocks that create deviations from the Law of One Price. Some reasons for the deviations -for example, asymmetric regional supply shocks -may be beyond the control of any policy maker. However, it is also possible that the deviations are partly caused by monetary policy makers, because of asymmetries in the response of prices in different locations to the same nationwide monetary policy shock. There is a small literature investigating asymmetries in the response of regional output levels to monetary policy (Toal, 1977; Garrison and Chang, 1979; Carlino and DeFina, 1998) , but hardly any attention has been paid to regional price asymmetries.
1 In this paper, we explore the magnitude of price asymmetries by combining existing data from the literature on price deviations with existing data from the literature on monetary policy shocks. The specific questions we address are:
(i) Are asymmetries in the impact of monetary shocks in the US a statistically significant component of variations in cross-city bilateral real exchange rates?
(ii) How much of the variation in real exchange rates is explained by monetary policy shocks?
(iii) How large is the inter-city price divergence caused by a typical monetary policy shock?
(iv) Are there any city-specific characteristics that help to explain such divergence?
Section 2 presents the time-series analysis that addresses question (i-iii) and Section 3 the crosssection analysis that addresses question (iv). We will see that there is clear evidence for statistically and economically significant asymmetries across US cities that explain a sizeable fraction of the observed variation in real exchange rates. These asymmetries are highly correlated with a number of city-specific economic and demographic characteristics. This suggests that aggregate nationwide prices do not contain all the information we need to calculate the welfare impact of changes in monetary policy.
Estimating the Size of Monetary Policy Asymmetries
In this paper we make use of two existing data sets. The price data are taken from Engel and Rogers (2001 where we have 28 cities and therefore 378 bilateral real exchange rates. These relative price series will be used to measure monthly deviations from the (proportional) Law of One Price, as explained below.
The second data set upon which we draw is from Romer and Romer (2004) , who construct a monthly time series of US monetary shocks. First of all, the authors infer the Fed's intention for the federal funds rate at the time of FOMC meetings from quantitative and narrative records. A regression of this constructed series on the Fed's internal forecasts then provides a basis for a measure of unanticipated changes in policy that is free of systematic responses to information about the future. The authors show that their measure of policy shocks has large and statistically significant effects on both aggregate US output and aggregate US inflation. The effects are substantially stronger and quicker than those obtained using conventional indicators. The monetary shocks data cover the period 1969(1)-1996(12), which encompasses the period for which we have price data. The estimated monetary shocks for 1986(12)-1996(6) are depicted in Figure 1 . The shocks for this period are somewhat smaller on average than for earlier years.
[ Figure 1 here] 
and similarly for the aggregate CPI:
where the β (L) and θ (L) are lag polynomial operators and u is an error term capturing non- and for each real exchange rate series a corresponding time-series variance. The first column in Table 1 reports, for each city, the average of these variances expressed percentage terms, in other words, 28 [ Tables 1-2 here] for each city in turn are depicted in Figure 3 ; these charts are constructed for a negative RESID shock equal to one sample standard deviation (0.15 points), using the estimated θ parameters from each equation (2) 
Explaining Monetary Policy Asymmetries
In this section we explore the causes of the cross-sectional variation in the data indicated in Table   3 ; our aim is to explain why an unanticipated fall in the interest rate raises prices more in some parts of the US than its does in others. We consider the following causes of asymmetries in the response of city-specific prices. Descriptive statistics for the variables below appear in Table 4 .
(i) The share of interest-sensitive industries
As noted by Carlino and DeFina (1998) , some industries may be more interest-sensitive than others. Therefore, total output and aggregate demand (and hence prices) will be more sensitive to monetary policy shocks in areas that are relatively intensive in the interest-sensitive industries. We are using data only from metropolitan areas, where agriculture and mining make up a negligible fraction of output. Nevertheless, we can control for the share of manufacturing in total employment, and also for the share of the wholesale and retail trade sector, which may be more sensitive to short-run fluctuations in consumer demand than other sectors. The Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes annual data on sectoral employment in each US metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and we use these employment shares, averaged over 1987-1996, to measure of the relative sizes of the manufacturing and trade sectors in each city.
(ii) Firm size
Small firms are more reliant on banks than are large ones, and monetary policy may affect the cost of bank loans more directly than it does the opportunity cost of other sources of finance (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993) . Moreover, Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) produce evidence that the rise in the cost of borrowing for small firms following a monetary contraction is particularly large, possibly because credit market imperfections arising from informational asymmetries are particularly severe for small firms. In this case, cities in which small firms make up a larger share of the total should manifest a particularly high level of interest sensitivity. We control for variation in average firm size across different cities by using data from the US Census Bureau industrial census. In the results reported below, the measure used is the fraction of firms with fewer than 20 workers in each MSA; changing the cut-off point to ten, 50 or 100 workers makes no significant difference to our results, nor does using the average number of workers per firm.
(iii) Bank size Kashyap and Stein (1995) argue that when monetary policy is tightened and reserves are restricted, large banks can find alternative sources of funding more easily and cheaply than small ones. In 
(iv) House prices
According to Caplin et al. (1997) , property values affect the sensitivity of households to interest rate changes. Lower property values make it relatively difficult for households to refinance their mortgages to take advantage of a fall in interest rates. They show that refinancing is much more limited in states with lower property values. Therefore, aggregate demand in cities in which property values are relatively high should exhibit more sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. Our measure of property values, taken from the 1990 census, is the median value of specified owneroccupied housing units for each MSA.
(v) Demography
Inter-temporal substitution of consumption may be more difficult for certain age groups. It is difficult to defer expenditure on some children's goods and services, such as education, and, for a given level of bequests, risky to defer consumption in old age, when the probability of death in the near future is quite high. We therefore include two demographic measures, both taken from the the age of 60. Changing these cut-off points to 16 and 70 respectively does not make any substantial difference to our results, and additional age dummies are statistically insignificant.
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[Tables 4-5 here] (17), but these include some of the largest in the US (for example, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank and Citibank), so the bank size measure for Buffalo is highly atypical of a city of its size. All of the explanatory variables are statistically significant, except firm size and the proportion of the population over 60. The removal of these variables from the regression equation has no substantial impact on the size of the other coefficients. All together, the explanatory variables account for about three quarters of the cross-sectional variation in the data.
As anticipated, an increase in the share of wholesale and retail firms in total employment is associated with greater sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. A one percentage point increase in the share leads a rise in relative prices over the next year that is greater by about 0.05 percentage points per month on average. The coefficient on the manufacturing employment share is negative, however. A one percentage point increase in this share leads to an average price effect that is about 0.01 percentage points lower. That manufacturing intensity should be associated with less monetary policy sensitivity in our data contrasts with the result of Carlino and DeFina (1998) , who find that the response of output to monetary policy is relatively large in manufacturing-intensive areas. However, the Carlino and DeFina regressions are for output rather than prices, and are based on state data rather than city data. (City data look very different from aggregate state data:
compare the positions of Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego in Table 3 .)
As anticipated, there is a negative coefficient on the bank size variable, indicating that cities with larger bank exhibit less sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. The regression coefficient is about -0.3. In order to interpret this coefficient, consider the estimated effect of reducing the bank size measure from its mean value (12.8) to its smallest observed value (11.7, Anchorage). This is predicted to increase the magnitude of a rise in relative prices following a monetary shock by 0.33 percentage points per month ([12.8 -11.7] 0.3). Consider also the estimated effect of increasing the bank size measure from its mean value to its largest observed value (13.7, San Francisco). This is predicted to reduce the magnitude of a rise in relative prices by 0.27 percentage points per month ([13.7 -12 .8] 0.3).
The coefficient on house prices is positive, as anticipated, with a value of about 0.14. Finally, there is a negative coefficient on the fraction of the city population below the age of 21. This means that there is less interest sensitivity in cities with a relatively high proportion of children. A one percentage point increase in the fraction of the population below the age of 21 leads to an average price effect that is about 0.03 percentage points lower.
Conclusion
Evidence indicates that the marked deviations from the Law of One Price across US cities can be explained partly by asymmetric responses to monetary policy shocks. These asymmetries are both economically and statistically significant, and can be partly explained by cross-city variations in a number of economic and demographic characteristics.
Such asymmetry has potentially important consequences for monetary policy. Just as the theory of optimal monetary policy is founded on the idea of maximising the welfare of a representative agent, real-world monetary policy targets make reference to the rate of inflation of a national consumer price index, that is, the rate of growth of the cost of living for an "average" consumer. But if consumers in different regions face different prices then concerns about the distribution of inflation rates resulting from a given monetary policy become relevant. De Grauwe (2000) and Gros and Hefeker (2002) show how in theory a monetary policy rule that ignores information at the regional level may lead to welfare losses when there are asymmetries in the transmission mechanism. An optimal monetary policy reaction function needs to put more weight on regions where prices are relatively unresponsive (Benigno, 2004) . Recent empirical studies of monetary transmission asymmetries in the EMU (Cecchetti, 1999; Elbourne and de Haan, 2004) reflect concern about this problem. Our evidence suggests that the concern is not necessarily limited to international monetary unions, and that national central banks may also need to review their reliance on national aggregate measures when conducting monetary policy.
Moreover, one should not imagine that asymmetries in the response of prices to a monetary shock will remain constant over the long run. The regional economic and demographic characteristics that explain the asymmetries are likely to change only slowly, but they will eventually change in response to regional economic development and structural adjustment. A deeper understanding of these processes could lead to significant improvements in the efficiency of monetary policy. SA713  SA11141  SA1113  SE07  SE33  SE28  SA1111  SA11121  SA0  SA2112  SE56  SA61  SE62  SE57  SE46  SE63  SA712  SA2313  SA51  SE20  SA221  SE29  SE32  SA3111  SE34  SE44  SE19  SE40  SE45  SE53  SA1115  SE06  SA3114  SA415  SE49  SE4701  SA11142  SA3112  SE27  SE41  SE22  SE2101 SA213 SE08 
